

An Economic Analysis of the 1st Nationalist Movement of 1783

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Abstract

There is a strong tradition of both: 1) considering the Articles of Confederation a dead-end in U.S. constitutional development, and 2) examining the economic motivation behind the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution. The constitutional movement, however, was not the first attempt at a stronger central government. This paper first overviews the 1783 drive to strengthen the Articles of Confederation that very nearly succeeded. Had this movement succeeded, the impetus for the drafting of the Constitution would have been significantly reduced. In short, the failure of the 1783 “1st nationalist movement” was not destined to happen, but is a critical turning point in U.S. constitutional history. After overviewing the importance of this turning point in history, this paper investigates the economic and geographic interests behind the “first nationalist movement.” A nationalist sentiment voting index is constructed for each delegate to the Articles of Confederation Congress. This index is regressed on state and delegate characteristics. Not surprisingly, nationalists tend to be from populous states and states less dependent on foreign trade. Being a military veteran is also associated with nationalist leanings. There are some surprises, however. State debts appear to play little role in nationalist sentiment and prior service in state government is positively correlated with nationalism. Finally, resulting measures of each delegate’s nationalist sentiment are examined.

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1 Introduction

The Articles of Confederation, the constitution governing the United States from 1781¹ until the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, are typically portrayed as a dead-end in U.S. history. If anything positive is implied about the Articles, it is that they served as both: 1) a necessary step for keeping the states together during the war and, 2) a bad example to inspire those drafting and ratifying the Constitution. The relatively few works with a more positive, or at least nuanced, portrayal describe the Articles as an interim step in the development of the early American federal system (McDonald, 2000, LaCroix, 2010), namely moving part-way from a system of sovereign states to a federal system in which the national government is, overall, ascendant. Even among these works, the strong impression is that the Articles of Confederation were not only a sub-standard form of government, but also not a survivable form of government.

The goals of this paper are three-fold. The first is to argue that the Articles of Confederation were not destined to be a dead-end. In fact, there were very real attempts to strengthen the Articles in 1781 and then again 1783. This “first nationalist movement” was not the work of those wanting to keep an anemic Confederation alive. Instead, it was the best hope for, and led by, those favoring a stronger national government (“nationalists” as termed in this paper). After the failure of this movement, nationalists eventually abandoned hope of strengthening the Articles of Confederation and took a new track starting in 1785. This second, more famous path, involved replacing the Articles rather than modifying them. It led to the Mount Vernon Conference in 1785, the Annapolis Convention in 1786, the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, and finally the ratification of the Constitution. Had this earlier nationalist movement succeeded, which it very nearly did, it is entirely probable that the young United States would have been left with a national government more functional than the original Articles of Confederation but much weaker than the national government under the later Constitution. The impetus for replacing the Articles, via a relatively radical and quasi-legal convention process, would have been greatly diminished. The history

of the United States would indeed have been very different. In short the failed attempt to strengthen the Articles should be seen as a turning point in U.S. history.

The second objective of this paper is to investigate the economic and geographic interests behind this first nationalist movement. Beginning with Charles Beard (1913, 1935) and more recently with McGuire and Ohsfeldt (1984, 1986, 1989), as well as McGuire (1988, 2003), there is a strong tradition of examining the economic motivation behind the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution. This paper conducts a preliminary analysis of voting to strengthen the Articles of Confederation in 1783. A “nationalist” voting index is first created for each delegate to the Congress. This gives us a quantitative measure of nationalist sentiment during this little studied period. Next, this index is regressed against delegate characteristics. The results shed light on which economic/geographic interests favored a stronger national government.

Finally (the third goal), the nationalism voting index is examined in the light of common historical perceptions of some of the more famous delegates. The un-deconstructed voting index offers a quantitative estimate of each delegate’s politics in practice. The part of the index not “explained” by state interests (the residuals plus a bit more) can be viewed as a more “pure” or independent measure of each delegate’s ideology.

2 The First “Nationalist Movement,” 1781 and 1783

The Articles of Confederation have long been recognized as a very weak system of national government. The national government, via the Congress, did have the power to pass legislation. It also established a court to hear disputes between states. It was, therefore, more than just an alliance of sovereign states. Nonetheless, the ability of the national government to assert power was very limited. It lacked specified powers such as the authority to raise armies and, probably most important of all, to tax. Voting was by state with the default being a state votes “Nay.” If a state delegation was absent, under-represented, or split,

this was equivalent to an automatic “Nay.”² In addition, a super-majority was required for passage: 7 states voting “Yeah” for procedural issues, 9 “Yeahs” for ordinary legislation, and 13 “Yeahs” for amendments. While this might have been partially offset by only having one house (versus two houses and an executive under the Constitution), the general consensus is that it was very hard for the Congress to pass much.

Those desiring a stronger national government recognized this and made attempts to strengthen the government under the Articles. A relatively broad-based movement (with the debate and correspondence actually beginning in late 1780) started in 1781. The main goal was to give Congress the authority and mandate to directly tax the states (by amending the Articles, i.e. requiring the consent of all 13 states) via a 5% “impost” or import tax. All but the Rhode Islanders eventually approved this. A second, more directed attempt was made in 1783. The Congress’ Superintendent of Finance, Robert Morris, was the leader of this movement. Again, taxing authority was central. However, this second movement also dealt with other nationalist issues such as the size, composition, and role of a peacetime army. It is this 1783 movement that this paper attempts to quantitatively analyze.

There are several reasons for limiting the study to 1783. First, the 1783 movement encompasses more issues than the 1781 movement. Finally, in 1783, one does not have to worry about military events (ex. Are the British on your state’s soil?) dictating each delegate’s voting pattern. Still, the final nature of the peace is uncertain, giving nationalists enough of a foreign threat to find support for a stronger government.

Although it may not have been evident at the time, the 1783 movement was the last hurrah for any nationalist attempts to reform the Articles of Confederation. While the impost is debated at the state level until 1787 (with New York being the main holdout this time, see Dougherty, 2001, 60-73), Robert Morris and much of his proposals were gone by late 1784. This lack of a specific agenda makes the identification of votes for the voting index more difficult and results in fewer available votes after 1783. Once the Treaty of Paris is signed and the results become known, the spectre of a foreign threat greatly diminishes

(although many aspects of the peace leaked out in the year proceeding the treaty's signing), temporarily weakening the nationalist movement. Supporting the idea that the nationalist movement declined after 1783 is research from authors attempting to identify factions in the Congress. These speak of a situation in which groupings shifted from nationalist versus localist factions in the years through 1783, to regional (in particular north-south) factions in 1784 and 1785 (Jillson and Wilson, 1994, 244- 267, Henderson, 1974, 281- 378).³ In short, it is difficult to develop a set of well-defined nationalism votes in 1784 and even more difficult thereafter.

Besides losing an identifiable nationalist agenda, alternative methods for strengthening the federal government, other than via actions on the floor of the Congress, began to appear viable starting around 1785. After these years prospects for expanding federal powers in the Congress were much more limited. It became obvious that the nationalists were not going to get significant, if any, extensions of federal power on the floor of the Congress. The prospects for legislation, emanating from the Congress itself, that significantly strengthened the national government are described as reaching a high point shortly before the Treaty of Paris (1783) and to have visibly declined thereafter. Much of this decline is attributed to the removal of wartime pressures for a unified and powerful national government (Ferguson, 1996, Rakove, 1979). Further, the possibility of a convention outside of the Congress which would strengthen or even replace the Articles was becoming very real.⁴ By 1785 some nationalists would come to believe that the best way to promote a strong national government was to vote against measures in the Congress which would strengthen the Articles. The logic was that any strengthening of the Articles would only be minor and would halt any impetus for action through outside conventions. James Madison, a Virginia delegate and supporter of the 1783 nationalist movement, stated in December of 1785, "*I think it better to trust to further experience and even distress, . . . than to try a temporary measure which may stand in the way of a permanent one.*"⁵ Other delegates were beginning to share Madison's belief that a limited strengthening of the federal government would prevent more sweeping reforms

(Rakove, 1979, 370 - 381).

The question arises of whether or not this movement, like the constitutional movement a few years later, had strong economic and geographic bases. Did this push for a stronger central government take place before the nationalist/anti-nationalist divide congealed around economic and geographic interests? This movement occurred before political coalitions were well-established. Peace was newly at hand, but there was not yet a peace treaty. It is not impossible to imagine a period in which nationalism was based mostly on ideology and shared experience within the Congress. A second question is, if economic and geographic interests were aligned with this nationalist movement, what were these interests?

3 Overview of the Methodology

Research on the causes of votes in legislatures typically identifies three key aspects: 1) party, 2) constituency effects, and 3) the personal ideology of the representative (Kuklinski, 1977, Lawrence, 2007, Rosenson, 2003, Ramey, 2015). These three factors, or some combination of them and other influences, are known as the “standard model” of legislator representation in Congress (Hill, 2015). Interestingly, America’s Congress under the Articles of Confederation lacked parties (see Aldrich and Grant, 1993). While there were groups of legislators that tended to vote the same way on certain issues, such clustering was fleeting (Jillson and Wilson, 1994); there was nothing resembling the party structures that would be seen under the Constitution. This is, in a way, fortunate, because there are numerous mechanisms by which parties can influence voting and thereby mask both constituency effects and personal ideology (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991, Miller, 2005, Rohde, 2013, Cox and McCubbins, 2005). As shown below, the reduced “standard model” of legislator voting under the Articles of Confederation is just a combination of constituency effects and personal issue preferences.

$$1) \textit{Delegate } i\textit{'s Voting Pattern} = \textit{Constituency Effects} + \textit{ } i\textit{'s Ideology/Issue Preferences}$$

As is common practice, voting patterns are measured by a voting index. In this case an index, termed **NAT**, measuring the frequency in which a delegate votes in favor of a strong national government is constructed. Constituency effects are proxied by measurable characteristics of each delegate's state and the local area in which he normally resides. A delegate's ideology/issue preferences is assumed to be a function of both measurable characteristics of the delegate (ex. military service) and unmeasurable personal preferences. The voting index values (**NAT**) are then regressed on state level and individual characteristics of the delegates.

The magnitude and confidence levels of the estimated coefficients give us insight into which interests supported a stronger national government and which opposed it. In addition, the estimated effects of individual delegate characteristics (ex. wartime military service) plus the residual can be interpreted as the delegate's ideology/issue preference. In fact, it has long been standard practice in voting index studies to interpret the each individual's residual as a measure of pure ideology (Kau and Rubin, 1979, 1993, Kalt and Zupan, 1984, 1990, Carson and Oppenheimer, 1984, Levitt, 1996, Voeten, 2005). Indeed, Lopez and Ramirez (2008) note that variations of this technique appear "pervasively." Further, unlike other common and otherwise valuable techniques for identifying the preferences of members of Congress, such as DW-NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997), preferences obtained through the residual technique are theoretically free of the influence of parties and less formal vote trading groups.

Finally, the small size of the Congress of Confederation should be noted. After discarding a few delegates who were present only for one or two votes, there are only 48 delegates in the voting index. This means the number of explanatory variables has to be rather limited. It is also natural to expect relatively low levels of confidence for the results. However, that is the nature of the data.

4 Choosing the Nationalism Votes

The first step in choosing the votes for the index is to define nationalism. Nationalism is broadly defined as desiring a central government with much power and a large role relative to that of the state governments. Nationalism is defined, more specifically, according to the agendas put forth during this period by Robert Morris and Alexander Hamilton. Morris was the biggest figure in what is sometimes referred to as the “nationalist” period in the later days of the war and the early post-war years, roughly 1782 to 1784 (Ferguson, 1961). During these years he served as Superintendent of Finance and led the initiative to give the Congress greater powers. Alexander Hamilton was a friend and correspondent of Morris.⁶ Hamilton had already espoused many of his arguments for a stronger central government by 1782. These can be found in a series of writings termed *The Continentalist* (or *The Continentalist Papers*). Hamilton would later author many of *The Federalists Papers*, lead the fight for the ratification of the Constitution in New York, and actively work to strengthen the federal government as Secretary of Treasury in Washington’s administration.

The following five tenets, from Morris’ and Hamilton’s agendas, are used in choosing votes for the voting index.⁷

- a) **Taxes:** Nationalists favor taxes specifically for the use of the U.S. government. Preferably, these should be collected and administered by agents of the U.S. government.⁸
- b) **Public Credit:** Nationalists favor U.S. government, not state, assumption of most of the Revolutionary war debt. Such debt should be funded but not completely retired.
- c) **Military:** A permanent and professional army was desired by nationalists. Issues of pay to the Army, including severance pay and pay non-active officers (the half-pay for life issue) also fall under this category.⁹
- d) **Bureaucracy:** A professional and relatively large bureaucracy for the U.S. govern-

ment was sought by nationalists.¹⁰

e) **Jurisdiction:** Nationalists favored expanding the jurisdiction of the U.S. government relative to that of the state governments.¹¹

In addition, the vote must, in the context of the proceedings within the Continental Congress, have a clear nationalist position (either yeah or nay). For example, on 07 January of 1783, there were four recorded votes on the issue of how to honor (or fund) outstanding Continental dollars. This is clearly an issue with nationalist/localist ramifications. Nonetheless, it is difficult to discern which position would enhance the nationalist position for each vote. The four votes include a vote on whether to postpone consideration of the matter (for which there could be a nationalist reason), changes in wording, etc. Based on the context in the *Journal of the Continental Congress* (JCC, Vol. XXIV, 30 – 42) none of these votes has a definitively nationalist or localist position.

Descriptions of the votes used can be found in the appendix. To identify each vote by number, we used New York State Historical Association’s *Atlas of Congressional Roll Calls, Volume I. The Journals of the Congress of the Continental Congress* are the primary source of the vote, and the immediate debate surrounding it.¹²

5 Calculating NAT, the Voting Index Measure

In simple voting indices, each vote counts the same. This is appropriate if there is low absenteeism among the voters and there are a great number of votes. However, if some delegates are present for only few votes, they are likely to have inaccurate index values. High rates of absenteeism were chronic in the Congress of Confederation.¹³ Consider the case of a delegate, present for only a few votes, who is roughly in the middle of the Congress when it comes to nationalist sentiment. If the delegate’s few votes are ones in which only a few extreme localists vote in favor of strengthening the central government, he will vote “pro-national” on all the votes. Therefore, his **NAT** will equal 1 indicating he is an ardent

nationalist. However, the nature of the votes in question, not the delegate’s preferences, were the main factor in determining this high ranking.

Weighting each vote based on how strongly national or localist the outcome is the ideal solution for this problem. However, it would be preferable to avoid subjective weightings. Instead the rarity of the two positions is used as an indicator of how strongly national or localist they are. For example, voting pro-national in a case in which only twenty percent of the delegates vote pro-national is more strongly indicative of nationalist sentiment than voting pro-national when eighty percent of the delegates do likewise. These weights used are equal to the ordinal ranking (from 0% to 100%) of the average delegate voting a particular position. In particular, the following weighting scheme, $\%ProNat_j$ is the proportion of delegates voting the nationalist position on vote j , is used.

$$2) \text{ Weight}_{ij} = \frac{1+(1-\%ProNat)}{2} = 1 - \frac{\%ProNat}{2}$$

(if delegates i votes a pro-national position on vote j)

$$3) \text{ Weight}_{ij} = \frac{0+(1-\%ProNat)}{2} = 1 - \frac{\%ProNat}{2}$$

(if delegates i votes a localist position on vote j)

For illustration, if there are 100 members in the legislature, and a vote is split 50-50, the average delegate voting in favor of the nationalist position has an ordinal ranking of 75%. The average delegate voting against the nationalist position has an ordinal ranking of 25%. On another vote in which 80% of the delegates voted pro-national, the ordinal position of the average “yeah” vote would be 60% (halfway between 20% and 100%), whereas the average anti-national voter’s percent rank is 10% (halfway between 0% and 20%).

NAT is simply the average of a delegate's weighted values for all votes for which he was present.¹⁴

$$4) \mathbf{Nat}_i = \frac{\sum \mathbf{Weight}_{ij}}{n}$$

where \mathbf{n} = no. of votes for which delegate \mathbf{i} was present

Where $\mathbf{Weight}_{ij} = 0$ if the delegate was absent

In case one has doubts about this weighting scheme, solace can be taken in the fact that the resulting measures are not greatly changed from the unweighted values. The correlation coefficients for the weighted and unweighted values of **NAT** are quite high.¹⁵

Finally, to be included, a delegate had to be present for at least 3 of the 20 votes in the index. The weighting procedure, discussed earlier, should address much of the problem caused by the high levels of absenteeism. Nonetheless, we are not comfortable including delegates with excessive absenteeism. This excludes 3 delegates thereby reducing the sample size from 51 to 48.

Like all voting studies, this analysis assumes single peaked preferences; a preferred point over the range measured by the voting index, with the delegate's utility continually decreasing as one moves either direction away from this point. Multi-peaked preferences are problematic in voting studies. An example of multi-peaked preferences would be a delegate whose first choice is greatly strengthening the Articles, second choice is doing nothing to strengthen them, and the absolute last choice is moderately strengthening them. His dislike for proposals to moderately strengthen the Articles presumably stems from a fear that this would preclude any more radical strengthening in the future.

It is therefore critical that this nationalist movement be seen as the only game in town for nationalists. Evidence seems to indicate this is the case. Robert Morris led the 1783 push

and others who would later be labelled Federalists supported it. There is no well-known evidence of any serious discussion of scrapping the articles at this point. Further, there was no history of a significant failure to strengthen the Articles of Confederation like there would be after the 1783 movement failed. For a nationalist, this movement was the best game in town in 1783.

The one known exception is Alexander Hamilton, arguably the most nationalist delegate in 1783. He indicated a preference for scrapping the Articles via a convention as early as 1780. He is on record as opposing many of these measures, including being the only delegate to vote with the (famously anti-nationalist) Rhode Islanders on the famous impost vote. Hamilton clearly has multi-peaked preferences.¹⁶ His desired outcome is off the scale of the voting index, and his second favorite outcome is on the anti-nationalist end of the index. While tempted to drop Hamilton from the data, we are uncomfortable with the idea of dropping individual observations. We therefore retain Hamilton's data. If, however, he shows up as anti-nationalist, the caveat regarding the peakedness of his preferences applies.

6 The De-construction of NAT

As stated previously, the decomposition of **NAT**, by regressing it on economic variables, has two goals. First, it gives us information on which economic interests were in favour of strengthening the federal government. Secondly, it will later allow us to calculate a nationalist value (index) for each delegate that is relatively “pure” or independent of what their constituent interests dictate. The right-hand side variables to be used in decomposing **NAT** are as follows.¹⁷

State-Level Delegate Variables

- a) **Trade**: This is an index of the importance of trade, per capita, in the state. Three components, equally weighted, go into the index. The first of these is **Export**, the

monetary value of exports per capita. A linear trend was fitted to trade data estimated by Gary Walton (1976) for the years just prior to the Revolution, and the early years under the Constitution.¹⁸ **Duties** is the second item. This is duties per capita collected later, under the early Constitutional period (1790-'91). 1790 through 1791 data is used because it is available (unlike data between the end of the colonial period and 1790). In addition, it reflects the actual amount of duties collected under a stronger national government. This should make **Duties** a good proxy for the amount of duties a delegate in 1783 should expect a stronger national government would collect. **Tonnage** is the final component of the **Trade** index measure. **Tonnage** is the measured tonnage handled by each state in 1790-'92 (collections did not begin in North Carolina and Rhode Island until 1791-1792). The variable **Trade** is simply the arithmetic average of a (0 to 100) **Export** index, **Duties** index, and **Tonnage** index. **Trade** is used as an indicator of the expected tax burden under a strengthened Confederation. Taxes on imports, as well as for a while exports, were almost certain to be the main tax supporting a stronger U.S. government (Rakove, 1979, 346, Jensen, 1979, 32). While certain domestic industries might benefit from this, individuals with interests in foreign trade would not. This suggest a negative relationship between this **Trade** and **NAT**.

b) **Debt**: This is estimated state debt per capita.¹⁹ Most of this was Revolutionary War debt assumed by the states and not yet retired. States with a large state debt per capita are expected to be more pro-national *ceteris paribus*. This is based on the expectation that a stronger central government would be more likely to assume these debts (Ferguson, 1961, 114. McGuire and Ohsfeldt, 1986, 87, Wallace, 2000, Dougherty, 2001, 70-73). A positive coefficient is therefore expected.

c) **Pop**: This is the natural log of estimated state population for that year. 1790 population figures are from the 1790 census. The log is used in the expectation that the impact of this variable increases at a decreasing rate. Population estimates are

available for all of the states for various years from 1780 to 1785.²⁰ An exponential growth curve was fitted to interpolate data for the missing years. **NAT** should be positively related to **Pop**. Under the Articles of Confederation states were officially sovereign and voting was by state. Under a more federal system voting would likely to be apportioned (in part) by population or a closely related measure. Large states would gain representation and small states would lose implying a positive coefficient for **Pop** (Jensen, 1979 45, Jensen, 1966, 141). Further, even in modern times, U.S. Senators from larger states are estimated to be more supportive of broad national interests over smaller and more localized projects. (Atlas, Hendershott, and Zupan 1997, 228)

d) **West**: This is the natural log of non-ceded lands per capita plus 0.1. Non-ceded means lands that have not been ceded by treaty from Native American tribes. The log is used in the expectation that the impact of this variable increases at a decreasing rate. The 0.1 is added because some states have no claims to disputed lands. West is as indicated below.

$$\mathbf{West} = \ln\left(\frac{\textit{square miles of unceded land claimed by state}}{\textit{state population}} + 0.1\right)$$

Only land cessions that were eventually recognized by the federal government are counted as ceded. Virginia's sessions are a potential wildcard in this study. Virginia did not formally turn over her last western land claims until later in 1783 and these were not accepted by the Congress until 1784. However, Virginia had agreed to do so prior to 1783. Therefore, Virginia's land cessions of 1783 are pro-rated by being counted as half ceded (the arithmetic average of the pre- and post-1784 cession values). Alternate results, based on counting Virginia's 1784 cessions as non-ceded are shown in the appendix. The basic results are unchanged.

Besides representing a source of jurisdictional conflict, these lands also represent a potential source of revenue for the government controlling them. States claiming these

lands would be likely to want to keep them for themselves and prevent them from going over to the “common good” as would be likely with a stronger central government.²¹ In sum, a negative correlation is hypothesized between **NAT** and **WEST**.

e) **Indian**: **RawIndian** is the proportion (0 to 1) of a state’s non-Indian citizens living within 50 miles of Indian lands.²² **Indian**: is simply the log of **RawIndian** plus 0.1 as indicated below.

$$\mathbf{Indian} = \ln(\mathbf{RawIndian} + 0.1)$$

States with a large population near Indian lands might be expected to clamor for federal assistance both for measures against the Indians as well as assistance in acquiring land for further settlement. This coefficient is expected to be positive.

Individual Delegate Variables

h) **Frontier**: **Frontier** is the natural log of the distance (in miles) a delegate lived from the nearest non-ceded lands.²³

A priori, the relationship between distance from the frontier and nationalist sentiment is less than clear unless **Indian** and **Frontier** are separable measures. Populations near Indian lands (and delegates from those areas) might want federal assistance both for measures against the Indians as well as assistance in acquiring land for further settlement. There is also the stereotype of frontiersmen as being suspicious of any outside authority be it state or national. At the very least, it has been recognized that there were different frontier and coastal interests in the Congress (Morgan and Schmidt, 1976, 13- 16, Jensen, 1966, Chapters 10 11). Fortunately, **Frontier**, **West**, and **Indian** are quite separable.²⁴

f) **Vet:** **Vet** is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the delegate served in the military (continental or state), and a 0 otherwise. 41.7% of the delegates are veterans. The strong expectation is that service in the military will be associated with a preference for a strong national government. This view is pervasive in historical writing on the early national period. The rationale is based on the idea that military service exposes an individual to the shortcomings of a weak national government (the Congress was woefully negligent in fulfilling its promises to fund the army and pay soldiers). Further, military veterans, both then and now often prefer a strong central authority over the “bickering” of self-interested politicians.

g) **State:** **State** is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the delegate previously served in the state government aside from the state legislature. The reason for excluding state legislative service is that it is almost universal among delegates. The delegates were chosen by their respective state legislatures. While having been a state legislature was not a necessary condition for service as a delegate to the Continental Congress, it was far and away the norm. *Ex ante*, the authors can see the linkage between this variable going either way. Service during the war could have shown a delegate first-hand the need for greater coordination among the states thereby making him more nationalistic. Alternatively, state service could be associated with state patronage or a preference/respect for state-level authority. 56.3% of the delegates have state government service.²⁵

The following equation is estimated using ordinary least squares regression.

$$\mathbf{NAT} = \hat{c} + \hat{B}_1 \mathbf{Trade} + \hat{B}_2 \mathbf{Debt} + \hat{B}_3 \mathbf{Pop} + \hat{B}_4 \mathbf{West} + \hat{B}_5 \mathbf{Indian} + \hat{B}_6 \mathbf{Frontier} + \hat{B}_7 \mathbf{Vet} + \hat{B}_8 \mathbf{State} + \mathbf{NatRes}$$

Finally, the (lucky or unlucky) absence of any Georgia delegates in 1783 should also be noted. While Georgia’s absence does cost observations, it allows one to conduct an investigation in which **Frontier**, **Indian**, and **West** are separable. Georgia had the most western land claims, and 100% of U.S. citizens in Georgia were less than 50 miles from Indian lands. Even with the use of natural logs, the Georgia delegates are head and shoulders above the other states when it comes to the value of these three variables and they become largely inseparable. The Georgia delegates return in 1784, but by that time the movement to strengthen the Articles is largely dead. Several nationalists who supported the 1783 push now favor attempting to replace the Articles of Confederation with a new Constitution.

7 Results

The results of estimating the above equation using ordinary least squares are given in **Table 1** below.²⁶

Examining **Table 1**, one sees that the roughly half of the variation in voting that is “explained” by the variables and the F-statistic is quite significant. The coefficients are mostly of the expected sign with the exception of **State**. **State** was the variable for which the authors were least certain, but, *ex ante*, the general expectation was that the coefficient would be negative rather than positive.

The estimated magnitude of a 1-standard-deviation increase in each explanatory variable is shown in the two rightmost columns. For example, if a delegate’s **Trade** value increases by 1 standard error, his value for **NAT** is predicted to fall by 0.331 standard errors. The far right column shows these effects with after normalizing the **NAT** values so that the least nationalist (by voting record) had a **NAT** value of 0, and the most nationalist delegate a **NAT** value of 100. If a delegate’s **Trade** value increases by 1 standard error, his value for this normalized **NAT** falls by 8.18 (ex. from 50 to 41.2). Given that the last two variables, **Vet** and **State**, are by nature binary, a 1-standard-deviation increase in **Vet** or **State** is

Table 1: OLS Decomposition of Nat (3 or more votes, ½ VA Cession counted)

obs = 48	R ² = .515	F-stat = 5.18
	adj R ² = .416	Sig of F-stat = 0.00019 %

Type of Variable	RHS Variable	Estimated Coefficient	p-stat (sig) <i>t-stat</i>	Estimated Δ in <u>Nat</u> from + 1 s.d.	
				s.d. Δ 's in <u>Nat</u>	Δ <u>Nat</u> if range = 0 to 100
	Intercept	-0.0223	97.0% -0.0378	N.A.	N.A.
State Level Constituent	Trade	-0.000792	1.82% -2.47	- 0.331	- 8.18
	Debt	0.0000302	98.9% 0.0139	0.00210	+ 0.0520
	Pop	0.0839	0.995% 2.71	0.474	+ 11.7
	West	-0.0475	16.3% -1.42	- 0.289	- 7.13
	Indian	0.0706	23.5% 1.21	+ 0.220	+ 5.4497
Local Constit.	Frontier	-0.0818	13.1% -1.54	- 0.254	- 6.26
Individual Delegate	Vet	0.0473	11.1% 1.63	+ 0.189 <i>+ 0.381 if 0 to 1</i>	+ 4.69 <i>+ 9.41 if 0 to 1</i>
	State	0.0645	3.19% 2.23	+ 0.260 <i>+ 0.519 if 0 to 1</i>	+ 6.43 <i>+ 12.8 if 0 to 1</i>

rather nonsensical. This would mean going from (for instance) 0% military veteran to 50% (actually, the standard error of **Vet** is 0.498) military veteran. One either served in the military or not. Therefore, for **Vet** and **State**, the estimated effect of going from a 0 (no service) to 1 (service) is shown at the bottom of the cell.

The very small sample size reduces one's expectations of finding highly significant estimated coefficients. Nonetheless, **Trade** and **Pop** are significant at better than the 5% level. **Trade**'s sign and significance and estimated magnitude (discussed below) support the hypothesis that much of the voting revolved around the expectation that a tax on trade (the impost) would be a central feature in any strengthening of the national government. Likewise, the results for **Pop** support the hypothesis that smaller states would lose relative influence in any strengthening of the national government.

State's estimated coefficient, especially in combination with its high level of confidence and magnitude of impact, is probably the largest surprise in the result. Perhaps the experience of serving in the public sector during the war, in any measure not just the military, gave one a sense of national purpose (and need) that outweighed any state versus national government jealousies.

Vet and **Frontier** are almost significant at the 10% level, not a bad showing considering the very small number of observations (48). Military service indeed appears to lead one to favor a stronger national government as expected. The values (negative coefficient) for **Frontier** suggest that the stereotype of the individualist, anti-authoritarian, frontiersmen holds true. **West** and **Indian** do not "perform" particularly well but are at least of the right sign. The evidence weakly supports the idea that state claims to western lands made a state and its representatives fear a stronger national government might diminish any gains that state could hope to gain from its western lands. Likewise, having a large population near Native American lands does seem to be correlated with wanting a larger federal presence to provide aid and/or reduce externalities by helping coordinate Indian policy. Again, however, the evidence only provides weak support for this idea.

After the negative (and highly significant) estimated coefficient for **State**, the biggest surprise for the authors is that **Debt** is markedly insignificant. **Debt**'s lack of any estimated effect is actually quite an important conclusion given all the attention Hamilton's later debt assumption plan receives. Perhaps without a stronger national government already in existence, and without a definitive plan for the federal assumption of state debts, this was not, in 1783, as much of an issue as it would be under the Constitution.

8 Quantitative Measures of Nationalist Sentiment

One should not forget that this study generates quantitative measures of nationalist leanings during the first nationalist movement. While these measures are arguably quite fallible, they could be a significant addition to the study of the nationalist movement that followed the American Revolution and continued into the early national period. Most information on where a figure stood is both anecdotal and geared toward the later part of this period. The Federalist vs. Anti-Federalist debates during the drafting of the Constitution, the ratification of the Constitution, and the first three presidencies are the basis for most classifications. This study provides a snapshot for the earlier years of the Early National period.

The first measure of nationalist sentiment is simply, **NAT**, the voting index. **Figure 1** shows the results of this measure for each of the delegates. Making the comparison a bit easier is the lucky fact that the arithmetic mean of the voting index is almost exactly 50% (50.6%).

Although the authors are certainly not experts on the delegates, and are in fact very naive regarding many of them, the results in **Figure 1** fit the general history well. As one would expect, the Rhode Islanders led by David Howell and Virginia's Arthur Lee (famous for his contrary rhetoric in the Continental Congress and brother of both Richard Henry Lee and Francis Lightfoot Lee) are the leading anti-nationalists. Even without the Pinkney's, South Carolina's delegation is the most nationalist. James Duane of New York is showing up

as a strong nationalist as expected. Alexander Hamilton (NY) is, as stated earlier, already against strengthening the Articles if it means keeping them alive longer than necessary. He is not, however, against strengthening the national government in ways that do not run the risk of turning the Articles into a survivable long-term government. Hamilton, for example, votes in favor of all the measures designed to provide for a permanent officer corps (see votes 920 to 929 in the appendix). Accordingly, Hamilton shows up as an anti-nationalist but not as extreme a one as Arthur Lee or the Rhode Islanders.

There could, however, be a few surprises. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts will later become famous being one of the few delegates to the Philadelphia constitutional convention to vote against the Constitution. At this point, however, he appears to be in support of a government much stronger than the Articles of Confederation. There was a large gap between a slight strengthening of the national government and going all the way to the U.S. Constitution. Madison is also interesting. Madison will go on to become one of the leading intellectual minds behind the Constitution but also a leader of the (anti-federalist) Democratic-Republican Party. Madison's 1783 voting index suggests that his attitudes towards government did not necessarily change. Instead, while he preferred something stronger than the Articles of Confederation, he did not prefer a stronger national government in every regard.

With the caveat that every added quantitative step a researcher introduces creates more room for error, one can go a step further and interpret the residuals as a more pure measure of sentiment. This interpretation of voting index residuals, as discussed previously, is quite common. Regarding the Articles of Confederation there are occasional references to at least some of the delegates having such divided sentiments; sentiments based on their state's interests versus their own personal sentiments. Morgan and Schmidt (1976), for example describes Thomas Burke of North Carolina (a delegate from 1777 to 1781) as having major qualms regarding North Carolina's claims to western lands. On the one hand, Burke felt it was in his state's interest to oppose the cessions of these lands. On the other hand, Burke

strongly sympathized with the nationalist idea of ceding or otherwise using these lands to the benefit of the United States as a whole (Morgan and Schmidt, 1976, 74-76).

A difficulty with this “residual as pure ideology” argument is that there is not always a sharp dividing line between a representative acting on behalf of a constituency and acting based on his or her personal beliefs. A congressional district in West Virginia today is more likely to elect someone who truly believes that coal mining is good for the nation than is an urban Los Angeles district. At best, the residual can be interpreted as a representative’s ideology that is not based on, or in sync with, the interests he or she represents. Therefore, the authors prefer the term “independent ideology” to “pure ideology.”

Continuing with this idea of “independent ideology,” not all of the voting index explained by the right-hand-side variables needs to be taken out. If a right-hand-side variable measures a characteristic of the delegate that is not highly correlated with his constituency, the author believes the effect of that variable should count as part of the delegates independent ideology. For example, assume Congresswoman Elizabeth Bennet has a degree in the liberal arts, contributes to several organizations for the arts, and buys 300 fiction books a year. Her constituency, however, does not differ from the norm in any measurable way when it comes to supporting the arts. Just because we quantify the type of degree each congressperson has, their giving to the arts, and the number of books they buy, and put these into my regressions does not mean their estimated effects should be attributed to her constituency. In short, we prefer to put back in the estimated effects of the three individual level characteristics; **Vet**, **State**, and **Frontier**, before presenting our “independent ideology” measures. The derivation of this measure, termed **NatInd**, is shown below.

$$\mathbf{NatInd} = \hat{B}_6 \mathbf{Frontier} + \hat{B}_7 \mathbf{Vet} + \hat{B}_8 \mathbf{State} + \mathbf{NatRes}^{27}$$

We are very confident including the estimated effects of **Vet** in **NatInd**. For the most part, a delegate’s military service was a thing of the past. The idea that a delegate would


be favoring a stronger national government to gain some favors from the military seems very far-fetched. Including the effects of **State** and **Frontier** is a harder call since these can measure a constituent interest. Although the state legislature chose that state's delegates to the Congress of Confederation, a frontier delegate likely had a career path that at some point meant representing the frontier. Likewise, a delegate with lots of connections in state government probably wished to keep many in the state establishment happy so he or she might have a job to return to when they are no longer a delegate. Still, the possible constituency effects of **Frontier** and **State** are less direct than the state-level variables (**Trade**, **Debt**, **Pop**, **West**, and **Indian**). Again, it was each state's legislature that chose the delegates to the Congress of Confederation.

Adding the estimated effects of **Vet**, **Frontier**, and **State** results in **NatInd** having a mean that is different than zero. When presenting **NatInd** in **Figure 2**, this mean has been subtracted. The range, however, has not been otherwise normalized. For example, the -16.2% value for David Howell of Rhode Island simply means that his **NAT** measure is 0.162 below where it would be based solely on his state's characteristics. The actual **NAT** values range from a low of 0.183 to a high of 0.686 rather than 0 to 1. If we normalized the ideology measure **NAT** in the Congress to run from 0 to 1, Howell's normalized **NatInd** would be -32.2%.

The results are shown in **Figure 2**. A couple of delegates are of interest. The Rhode Island delegates, while still anti-nationalists, are less rabidly anti-nationalists than their unadjusted voting record would imply. Rhode Island was more exposed to foreign trade than any other state. One can argue that much of the Rhode Island delegations opposition to strengthening the national government was the rational fear of taxes levied on foreign trade. Arthur Lee of Virginia is the most anti-nationalist according to **NatInd**, something the authors find quite believable (he was the rhetorical leader of the anti-establishment faction in the Congress). Finally, the delegates from Delaware stand out even more so than they did in **Figure 1** (**NAT**, the unadjusted voting index). While the authors are not

overly familiar with either Gunning Bedford Jr. or Eleazer McComb of Delaware, perhaps they deserve more investigation.

Figure 2: NatInd, Nationalist Sentiment Independent of State Interests



9 Conclusion

One goal of this paper has been threefold. The first is to draw further attention to this critical, but often neglected turning point in U.S. history. The Articles of Confederation are often depicted as doomed to fail. In fact, they almost were strengthened in a way that might have allowed them to exist as the United States' national government for much longer than they did. This possibility of "success" does not mean the outcome under a strengthened Articles of Confederation would be good. Most economists (including the lead author) strongly prefer the U.S. Constitution to strengthened Articles of Confederation. Instead, the idea that the Articles were almost strengthened in a way that would have reduced the impetus for the Constitution should make one more appreciative of the narrow and often lucky path the United States took to get its Constitution. The second goal is to provide some rudimentary analysis of what interests supported (and opposed) this first nationalist movement. Populous states with a relatively low exposure to international trade tended to be the biggest supporters. Veterans and, surprisingly, those with service in state governments (outside of a state legislature) also supported a stronger national government. Finally, a set of (admittedly imperfect) quantitative measures of this set of forgotten founding fathers have been generated. Perhaps these, in conjunction with the more traditional narrative histories, can shed light on this formative period.

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Notes

¹While the drafting of the Articles of Confederation was completed and submitted to the states for ratification in late 1777, they were not finally ratified until March 1, 1781. They did, however, guide the Second Continental Congress in the interim.

²A state had to be represented by at least 2 delegates (and not more than 7) for it to cast a vote. Therefore states with 0 or 1 delegate (ex. Georgia during all of 1783) were automatically “Nay” votes. States with an adequate number of delegates, but no majority among the state delegates, were likewise “Nay” votes. For example, if North Carolina has 2 delegates in attendance, 2 being the norm for most states, and one delegate votes “Yeah” and the other “Nay,” North Carolina therefore votes “Nay.”

³In fact, 1783 is the only year that Henderson specifically identifies nationalist/anti-nationalist factions.

⁴The first serious calls for an outside convention came in 1785. (Jensen, 1979, 33.) In this instance the Massachusetts legislature instructed its delegates in the Congress to propose such a convention. The Massachusetts delegates, however, refused. The first two convention outside the Congress, were between Maryland and Virginia, were also in 1785. This was limited to trade issues. In 1786 the Annapolis Convention would be held. This convention called for the Philadelphia Convention which drafted the Constitution, the document which would replace the Articles and provide for a much stronger national government.

⁵Quoted from Rakove, 1979, 369

⁶See “Letter of Hamilton to Robert Morris” in *The Works of Alexander Hamilton*.”

⁷Three very prominent features of Hamilton’s political thought are not explicitly mentioned in these five tenants. The first of these is regulation of foreign trade. We haven’t included this as a separate category because it is implicitly a part of taxing authority and expanding the jurisdiction of U.S. government. The second missing feature is Hamilton’s desire for a strong executive. This is excluded because: 1) We do not have writings to indicate Morris advocated this (although his actions indicate he favored much authority and strong actions for the quasi-executive boards), 2) The desire to have a professional bureaucracy is quite similar, and 3) there aren’t any votes regarding a true executive in this period. Finally, Hamilton advocated the establishment of a National Bank. Morris, obviously after his role in establishing the Bank of North America, was also a proponent of this. This is not included simply because there are no votes regarding the bank during the years studied.

⁸Hamilton. *Letter to James Duane*. p 25, 29, 32 - 33., *The Continentalist No. IV*. p 51. *The Continentalist No. VI*. p 62. (All of these are from *The Works of Alexander Hamilton*). Also *Letter to George Washington of 08 April, 1783*. p 20 - 23 (The Federalists). See also Ferguson (1966, xv, 116, 142 - 143, 146-148, 160 - 161). Main, p 15, chap. 5. The prefatory notes to the *Journals of the Continental Congress* for

the years 1783 - 1785 (JCC. vol. 24, p v - vii. vol. 26, p v - vi. vol. 28, p v - ix) also refer to an independent income for the federal government as one of the principle issues of these years. These prefatory notes were written in the twentieth century by the editor(s) compiling the various papers and into the *Journals of the Continental Congress*. Also, see Anderson p 15.

⁹Hamilton. *Letter to James Duane*. p 24, 26, 30 - 31. Also see Jensen. *The New Nation*. 82. etc. Ferguson 1966, p 50, 115, 157 - 159, 164, 169 - 170.

¹⁰Hamilton. *Letter to James Duane*. p 29 - 30, and possibly p 26 - 27. *The Continentalist No. VI*. p 65 - 66. Also see Wood. p 81 - 93. also Main, p 15 - 17. also Ferguson 1966. p 116.

¹¹Hamilton wrote in 1780 “The fundamental defect is a want of power in Congress” (*Letter to James Duane*. p 22). He referred to Congress’ need for more power numerous other times (*Letter to James Duane*. p 28, *The Continentalist No. 1*. p 41-43, *The Continentalist No. III*. p 51. Although he doesn’t specifically use the word jurisdiction or authority he is obviously talking about these. Furthermore, it seems difficult to eliminate a general expansion of congressional authority from the more specific points (a to d) given above.

¹²JCC vol 1. p 5-6. This reference is from the prefatory (i.e. editor’s) notes. Beginning with the first Continental Congress in 1774, daily notes or journals were kept of the body’s proceedings. These journals were more succinct and haphazard than the House and Senate journals later seen under the Constitution. At times there were multiple journals in existence, none of which, by themselves, gave a complete description of events. In the early twentieth century these various journals were compiled into the *Journals of the Congress of the Continental Congress*. The same name is applied to the records of the Congress both before and after it adopted the Articles of Confederation.

¹³Jillson and Wilson. *Congressional Dynamics*. p 153-163. Montross. p 382, 396.

¹⁴Since **NAT** is bounded, there is the possibility of a clustering of measures at the extreme values. There is also the possibility of forecasted values of **NAT** falling outside of the feasible range (see Kau and Rubin, 1979). For this reason, the natural log of the odds ratio, i.e. $\ln\left(\text{upperbound} - \frac{\text{NAT}}{\text{upperbound} - \text{NAT}}\right)$, is often used. The upper bound for **NAT** is 1 if the unweighted values are used. It differs when weighted values are used. We do not use this weighting procedure for two reasons. First, with our data, there is not a clustering of values at the extreme ends of the spectrum. Instead they have a relatively normal distribution. Secondly, fitted values do not fall outside of the feasible range. Since the problems this transformation is designed to fix are not present, the simpler, untransformed values are used. Consistency was the criteria for choosing this weighting. In particular, consider a case in which delegate A was present on all votes for which delegate B was present. In addition, A was present for an additional set of votes. Further assume that on the set of votes common to A and B, A voted pro-national more often than B. A should have a higher value for **NAT** than B to be consistent. The weighting scheme used in this thesis improved this consistency.

¹⁵The correlation between the unweighted and weighted index is 0.9942 when calculated based on delegates who voted at least 5 times. We need to re-calculate it based on delegates voting at least 3 times.

¹⁶Alexander Hamilton is known to have opposed the 1783 impost measure (i.e. adopted the localist position) as it was worded because he thought it was too limited an extension of national authority. In particular, the central government was given fewer revenue sources than in previous plans. He believed passage of the measure would preclude further extensions of central government authority in this regard (See Ferguson 1966 Chap. 7.). Hamilton even advocated a general convention to strengthen the federal government, rather than working within the framework of the Articles, as early as 1780 (Jensen. *The New Nation*. p 50 - 51., Rakove 1979 p 325 - 326.). Hamilton, during these years, appeared to be alone in seriously viewing an outside convention as a possibility, as well as believing that significant extensions of federal power could be had if lesser, compromise extensions were avoided. According to Rakove (1979 p 346) a 1784 proposal for a convention to suggest amendments to the Articles was never given serious consideration. Also see Rakove 1979 p 370 and 372. In addition to Alexander Hamilton, General Phillip Schuyler by 1781 supported a national convention to produce a government superseding the Articles. (Beard. P 55) i.e. Phillip Schuyler is the only other national figure for whom I evidence that he may have opposed strengthening the Articles for nationalist reasons. General Schuyler, however, was never a delegate to the Congress of Confederation. Further, beyond Alexander Hamilton and Phillip Schuyler, I have found no evidence indicated that any other nationalist figures desired to keep the Articles weak in attempt to further nationalist goals. Perhaps the best evidence of this is Hamilton voting against the impost in April of 1783. He was only one of four to vote against this (versus 25 in favor). His “support” came from Higginson of Massachusetts and the Rhode Island delegation, recognized as the most localists by Alexander Hamilton as well historians of today. Hamilton stated that he viewed the Rhode Island delegation as opposing any sort of compromise and doing their utmost to sink the impost. JCC vol 25. p 902. Also see Ferguson (1966 p 152-155). David Howell especially is credited with the defeat of the impost. Also see: Henderson. p 320. Henderson only classifies four delegates as localist. Two of these four are David Howell and William Ellery of Rhode Island.

¹⁷ Population, namely the natural log of estimated state population for that year was used in an earlier study. We will likely bring this back in when (and if) we do a fixed effects study (which gives us many more degrees of freedom). There are several arguments for using a population measure. First, representation under a stronger national government was likely to remain in part on the basis of states rather than population. This, of course, happened under the Constitution. Secondly, if representation was related to population, the level of requisitions would likely be also. More populous states already saw higher requisitions but their burden might rise with a move to representation by population. These imply that a doubling of a

Correlation Coefficients Between Trade Measures

1783	RawEXP	Export	Duties	Tonnage
RawEXP	1			
EXPORT	.9261	1		
Duties	.8731	.6711	1	
Tonnage	.8397	.6933	.8895	1

state's population would lead to less than a doubling of a state's interest in a stronger national government. Finally, there was discussion on changing the representation (and taxation) to the value of improved land and buildings these years. The population data is found in *Historical Statistics of the United States* (p 25 - 37. 1168 - 1171). More information on the sources of pre-1790 data can be found in *Population Distribution in Colonial America* by Stella Sutherland (p 11, 16, 20, 21, 69, 98, 124, 135, 174, 174, 212, 240.)

¹⁸Correlation coefficients between these trade measures are as follows: Data on exports, duties, and tonnage is found in *American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. 1.* p 140- 165 and 250. We generated fitted values for exports per capita by fitting a linear time trend between pre-Revolutionary figures reported by Shepherd and Walton (1976) and the 1790 - 92 figures used (RawEXP). We call this measure **Export**. Per capita gross import duties per capita (**Duties**) for 1790- 91 as well as per capita tonnage (**Tonnage**) for 1790 - 92 (after collections were finally begun in North Carolina and Rhode Island) was also calculated. The reason the coefficients change from year to year, even though most of the values are for 1790-91, is that the mix of delegates changes. There are different numbers of delegates from some states each year.

¹⁹Figures for 1790 come from "Report on the Assumption of State Debts" by Alexander Hamilton. in *American State Papers: Finance* Vol. I p 28-29 (also Ratchford. *American State Debts.* p 50-51). Estimates for various years in the 1780s are available for some of the states (Ratchford. *American State Debts.* p 45.) We fitted a linear trend for states in which two data points were available and used the 1790 data otherwise. The states for which two data points were available did not exhibit radical changes over this period. Therefore we felt it appropriate to use 1790 data in all years for the other states.

²⁰This data is found in *Historical Statistics of the United States* (p 25 - 37. 1168 - 1171). More information on the sources of pre 1790 data can be found in *Population Distribution in Colonial America* by Stella Sutherland (p 11, 16, 20, 21, 69, 98, 124, 135, 174, 174, 212, 240.)

²¹Hamilton. "The Continentalist No. IV." p 52.

²²This variable was generated as follows. First the 1780 and 1790 population maps in Friis' *Series of Population Maps of the Colonies and the United States* were enlarged greatly. These maps are derived from state level censuses, tax data, and the parts of the national 1790 census not burned by the British, etc. On these maps Friis placed a dot to mark the approximate location of every (200 or so) rural citizens. (Friis.

Correlation Coefficients Between Explanatory Variables

	Vet	State	Frontier	Trade	Debt	Pop	West	Indian
Vet	1	-0.021	0.000	-0.049	0.032	-0.002	-0.005	0.184
State	-0.021	1	-0.014	0.143	0.227	0.046	-0.017	0.051
Frontier	0.000	-0.014	1	-0.169	-0.165	0.032	0.525	-0.455
Trade	-0.049	0.143	-0.169	1	0.218	0.090	-0.273	0.359
Debt	0.032	0.227	-0.165	0.218	1	0.018	0.024	0.576
Pop	-0.002	0.046	0.032	0.090	0.018	1	0.600	0.304
West	-0.005	-0.017	0.525	-0.273	0.024	0.600	1	-0.044
Indian	0.184	0.051	-0.455	0.359	0.576	0.304	-0.044	1

A Series of Population Maps of the Colonies of the United States.) More information on the sources of this population data can be found in Stella Sutherland’s *Population Distribution in Colonial America*. We then transferred boundary lines of non-ceded lands onto this map. These boundaries were obtained from the following sources: Kappler p 5 - 10, *American Indian Documents* vol. 18, Coe p 139 - 140, *The Atlas of Early American History* p 61, and Prucha’s *Atlas of North American Indians*. Cessions never recognised by the federal government, even many years after the fact, are excluded. Examples include those by the state of “Franklin” and several of Georgia’s cessions during this period. The boundaries were extended 50 miles and the number of dots within the extended boundaries was counted. The 1790 values and 1780 values were interpolated to produce an estimate for the year in question. This was then divided by the state’s estimated population for that year (see the next sub-section). For years in which boundaries changed, the average of the before and after values was taken. Several counts were taken for each state for each year to insure consistency. Those living in modern-day West Virginia and Kentucky were considered to be Virginians. Those in Tennessee were counted as citizens of North Carolina. Those in Mississippi and Alabama were considered Georgia citizens. With the above exceptions, modern state boundaries were used in classifying citizens. Those living in the Northwest territory were not counted as citizens of any state.

²³The delegate’s stated home of residence was found in the New York Historical Society’s *Atlas of Congressional Roll Calls* (1934).

²⁴The simple correlation coefficients are shown above.

²⁵The **Vet** and **State** variables come from: 1) *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774-2005*, 2) the National Governors Association, and 3) Wikipedia.

²⁶We might switch to GLS at some time in the future. While the dependent variable is bounded by 0 and 1 (and the measured values fall between 0.183 and 0.686), the predicted value all fall within this range. This, and the desire to keep things simple (the sample is not extensive enough to deserve lots of manipulation) are why the authors stuck with OLS.

²⁷Adding $\hat{B}_1 \mathbf{Vet} + \hat{B}_2 \mathbf{State} + \hat{B}_3 \mathbf{Frontier}$ results in **NatInd** having a mean that is different than zero.

When presenting **NatInd** in **Figure 2**, this mean has been subtracted.

Appendix 1: Nationalism Index Votes

- Notes: 1) The vote numbers listed are those given in the Atlas of Congressional Roll Calls of the New York Historical Association.
- 2) The column labelled "Natl" indicates the more pro-national position (Yea or Nay) on the vote.
- 3) The "Yea" and "Nay" columns count the votes of individual legislators other than those excluded from the votes.

1st half of 1783

Date	Vote	Description	Natl	Yea	Nay
06 Feb 1783	912A	that the States be required to pass laws and appoint commissioners to procure accurate estimates of the value of all lands (including buildings and improvements) and to pass laws to collect taxes to meet Congress' requisitions (rejected)	Yea	16	9
12 Feb 1783	914	to adopt proposition stating that Congress is of the opinion that the establishment of permanent and adequate funds on taxes or duties to operate in just proportions throughout the U.S. are indispensably needed to do justice to public creditor, restore public credit, and meet the exigencies of war (adopted)	Yea	24	5
14 Feb 1783	916	to postpone consideration of the report calling for each state's legislature to submit the name of a commissioner to oversee the estimation of the value of all land (including improvements) within that state (14 Feb. 1783)	Nay	9	20
17 Feb 1783	917	to adopt resolution report calling for each state's legislature to submit the name of a commissioner to oversee the estimation of the value of all land (including improvements) within that state and to report these values to the Congress; said values are to serve as the basis for proportioning sums to be raised to support the public credit and contingent expenses (rejected)	Yea	18	9
17 Feb 1783	918	to adopt the above resolution with the following changes: the date to submit the commissioner's names to Congress is delayed from 01 Jan '84 to 01 Mar '84 and to a grand committee be appointed by Congress rather than a committee of commissioners from each state (adopted)	Yea	22	5
26 Feb 1783	920	to amend resolution granting officers of the Continental Army full pay for _____ years, by inserting "5 and ¼" in the blanks (rejected)	Yea	20	8
26 Feb 1783	921	to amend resolution referred to above by granting officers full pay for 5 years (adopted)	Yea	21	7
28 Feb 1783	922	to adopt paragraph granting officers full pay for five years (adopted)	Yea	22	8
10 – 15 March: Newburgh Conspiracy/Letter					
12 - March: News reaches Philadelphia that a preliminary U.S.-Britain peace was signed					
19 – March: British commander Guy Carlton confirms the preliminary treaty					
18 Mar 1783	929	to adopt resolution granting officers full pay for five years (rejected)	Yea	27	8
21 Mar 1786	932	to take up for consideration and completion the part of the report on the public credit which relates to imposts on imported goods and merchandise	Yea	9	22
18 Apr 1783	947	to adopt the act recommending to the states that they invest in Congress the power to levy duties on imports for 25 years, that they appropriate substantial revenues to for paying off the federal war debt, make acceptable cessions of western lands, and ratify the proposed revision of the articles so that states shall pay for expenses for the common defence and general welfare based on their population (free citizens + 3/5 slaves) adopted	Yea	25	4

2nd half of 1783

Date	Vote	Description	Nat	Yea	Nay
07 Aug 1783	974	to postpone motion that the Commander-in-Chief be requested to attend Congress, that a committee be appointed to confer with him on the peace arrangement and to report the proper manner of receiving him, in order to consider motion that a committee be appointed to report the proper measures to be adopted with respect to the reception of the Commander-in-Chief (rejected)	Nay	13	12
07 Aug 1783	975	to appoint a committee to confer with the Commander-in-Chief on the peace arrangement (carried)	Yea	20	6
13 Aug 1783	976	to substitute "union" for "government" in the letter responding to the inhabitants of New Jersey; said letter states "...Congress received with pleasure their congratulations on the success of the war, are obliged by the respect and affection for the federal government in their address, and highly approve of their patriotic disposition ..." (rejected)	Nay	4	20
27 Aug 1783	981	to amend the motion to take into consideration what powers exist in Congress by the Confederation, for the purpose of forming a military peace establishment, by inserting the words "whether any and" in between "consideration" and "what" (rejected)	Nay	10	14
27 Aug 1783	982	to postpone consideration of the motion to take into consideration what powers exist in Congress by the Confederation, for the purpose of forming a military peace establishment "to consider the question of a peace establishment" (rejected)	Yea	14	10
16 Sept 1783	995	to let the words preserving the Agent of the Marine's position stand in the act eliminating the Marine Department except for the agent of Marine, (accepted, words stand)	Yea	15	6
17 Sept 1783	996	to retain the provision providing that officers who do not accept the proposal of their state shall nevertheless be granted the benefits granted by the Congress (accepted, words stand)	Yea	20	4
26 Sept 1783	1010	to adopt the paragraph proposing that a special committee be appointed to deliberate and report on a means of strengthening American commerce with Europe through obtaining additional support for the Union from the several states ..." (adopted)	Yea	16	6
04 Nov 1783	1063	that the Commander-in-Chief be authorized to and directed to, after the evacuation on New York by the British, to discharge the federal army except for 500 men and officers, or such as he feels necessary (rejected)	Nay	12	3

Appendix 2: Alternate Specification

Table 2: OLS Decomposition of Nat (3 or more votes) Treating VA's 1784 cession (West*) as 100% non-ceded in 1783

		$R^2 = .508$	$F\text{-stat} = 5.03$	
		$\text{obs} = 48$	$\text{adj } R^2 = .407$	
		$\text{Sig of } F\text{-stat} = 0.00025 \%$		
Type of Variable	RHS Variable	Estimated Coefficient	p-stat (sig) t-stat	Estimated Δ in Nat from + 1 s.d.
				s.d. Δ 's in Nat Δ Nat if range = 0 to 100
	Intercept	-0.0744	91.7% -0.105	N.A. N.A.
State Level Constituent	Trade	-0.000784	2.34% -2.36	- 0.3279 - 8.10
	Debt	0.000542	81.9% 0.230	+ 0.0378 + 0.933
	Pop	0.0837	1.88% 2.45	+ 0.472 + 11.7
	West	-0.0600	24.4% -1.18	- 0.279 - 6.90
	Indian	0.0618	30.4% 1.04	+ 0.193 + 4.76
Local Constituent	Frontier	-0.0808	17.1% -1.40	- 0.2508 - 6.20
Individual Delegate	Vet	0.0485	10.5% 1.07	+ 0.195 + 4.81 <i>+ 0.391 if 0 to 1 + 9.65 if 0 to 1</i>
	State	0.0653	3.10% 2.24	+ 0.263 + 6.51 <i>+ 0.526 if 0 to 1 + 13.0 if 0 to 1</i>

Table 3: Correlation Coefficients, Treating VA's 1784 cession (West*) as 100% non-ceded in 1783

	Vet	State	Frontier	Trade	Debt	Pop	West	Indian
Vet	1	-0.002	-0.007	-0.035	0.017	-0.002	-0.013	0.195
State	-0.002	1	-0.024	0.159	0.203	0.046	0.003	0.067
Frontier	-0.007	-0.024	1	-0.174	-0.156	0.032	0.577	-0.458
Trade	-0.035	0.159	-0.174	1	0.201	0.090	-0.288	0.368
Debt	0.017	0.203	-0.156	0.201	1	0.017	0.109	0.555
Pop	-0.002	0.046	0.032	0.090	0.017	1	0.585	0.303
West*	-0.013	0.003	0.577	-0.288	0.109	0.585	1	-0.079
Indian	0.195	0.067	-0.458	0.368	0.555	0.303	-0.079	1

Figure 3: NatInd*, Nationalist Sentiment Independent of State Interests, Treating VA's 1784 cession (West*) as 100% non-ceded in 1783

